<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>netsekure rng &#187; TLS1.1</title>
	<atom:link href="http://netsekure.org/tag/tls1-1/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://netsekure.org</link>
	<description>random noise generator</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 18:44:15 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.2</generator>
		<item>
		<title>Windows SSL/TLS update for secure renegotiation</title>
		<link>http://netsekure.org/2010/08/windows-ssltls-update-for-secure-renegotiation/</link>
		<comments>http://netsekure.org/2010/08/windows-ssltls-update-for-secure-renegotiation/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 Aug 2010 05:16:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Nasko</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[KB 980436]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MS10-049]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[renegotiation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RFC 5746]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SSL]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS1.1]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS1.2]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netsekure.org/?p=283</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Couple of weeks ago Microsoft released an update to the SSL/TLS stack to implement secure renegotiation as described in RFC 5746. The Microsoft KB article describes the three settings controlling the behavior of the patch, but a bit more detail can be useful. A bit of background first. TLS extensions are a method of extending [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://netsekure.org/2010/08/windows-ssltls-update-for-secure-renegotiation/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>6</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Results after 30 days of (almost) no trusted CAs</title>
		<link>http://netsekure.org/2010/05/results-after-30-days-of-almost-no-trusted-cas/</link>
		<comments>http://netsekure.org/2010/05/results-after-30-days-of-almost-no-trusted-cas/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 May 2010 17:25:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Nasko</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Projects]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chrome]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Firefox]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IE]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SSL]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS1.1]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS1.2]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[trusted CA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[trusted root certificates]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netsekure.org/?p=261</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Today marks the 30th day since I removed all the root certificates for trusted certificate authorities. It was an interesting one month and I&#8217;ve learned a bunch. The main takeaway from this experiment is that I don&#8217;t need 3 digit number of trusted CAs in my browser. Again, this is person specific and US centric, [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://netsekure.org/2010/05/results-after-30-days-of-almost-no-trusted-cas/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>3</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>How to disable trusted root certificates</title>
		<link>http://netsekure.org/2010/04/how-to-disable-trusted-root-certificates/</link>
		<comments>http://netsekure.org/2010/04/how-to-disable-trusted-root-certificates/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 15 Apr 2010 06:55:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Nasko</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chrome]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Firefox]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[https]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IE]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SSL]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS1.1]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS1.2]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[trusted CA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[trusted root certificates]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netsekure.org/?p=227</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[As part of my testing of how many trusted root certificates I need for my day-to-day activities, I needed to ensure I don&#8217;t trust any certificate authorities. There is a great post by Nelson Bolyard to one of the security mailing lists of Mozilla, which explains why one should not delete CA certificates, but rather [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://netsekure.org/2010/04/how-to-disable-trusted-root-certificates/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>7</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>TLS overhead</title>
		<link>http://netsekure.org/2010/03/tls-overhead/</link>
		<comments>http://netsekure.org/2010/03/tls-overhead/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 12 Mar 2010 17:47:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Nasko</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[overhead]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SSL]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS message sizes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS Overhead]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS1.1]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS1.2]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netsekure.org/?p=203</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Every so often I get the question – “What is the overhead incurred by using TLS?”. Strangely enough, I couldn’t find a straight answer by doing some searching on the web, so let’s explore the answer. The TLS handshake has multiple variations, but let’s pick the most common one – anonymous client and authenticated server [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://netsekure.org/2010/03/tls-overhead/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>TLS Renegotiation MITM fix is now official</title>
		<link>http://netsekure.org/2010/02/tls-renegotiation-mitm-fix-is-now-official/</link>
		<comments>http://netsekure.org/2010/02/tls-renegotiation-mitm-fix-is-now-official/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Feb 2010 21:09:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Nasko</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Completely Random]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MiTM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[renegotiation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SSL]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS1.1]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS1.2]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netsekure.org/?p=197</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[As of Feb 12th, the solution for the TLS renegotiation man-in-the-middle attack is an official IETF standard: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746 I&#8217;m super happy and excited as this is the first RFC I am a co-author of and it fixes a major problem with one of the most widely used security protocols. Now let&#8217;s hope it will get [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://netsekure.org/2010/02/tls-renegotiation-mitm-fix-is-now-official/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>TLS renegotiation status update</title>
		<link>http://netsekure.org/2010/02/tls-renegotiation-status-update/</link>
		<comments>http://netsekure.org/2010/02/tls-renegotiation-status-update/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Feb 2010 23:15:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Nasko</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Completely Random]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SSL]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS1.1]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS1.2]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netsekure.org/?p=194</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[It&#8217;s been a while since I last checked any news or used a computer. I was away for more than a month spending time with our new baby daughter and almost completely disconnected from the tubes of the net. Now that I&#8217;m back, I wanted to point to a patch from Microsoft that allows admins [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://netsekure.org/2010/02/tls-renegotiation-status-update/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>TLS Renegotiation Test</title>
		<link>http://netsekure.org/2009/11/tls-renegotiation-test/</link>
		<comments>http://netsekure.org/2009/11/tls-renegotiation-test/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 28 Nov 2009 17:33:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Nasko</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[man-in-the-middle]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MiTM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[renegotiation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SSL]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS1.1]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS1.2]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vulnerability]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netsekure.org/?p=156</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The new TLS/SSL man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack targets the renegotiation part of the protocol. There are two variations of the renegotiation &#8211; client initiated and server initiated. This tool allows you to test any web server (input as server:port) for client initiated renegotiation support, as server initiated renegotiation depends on specific server configuration. As currently there [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://netsekure.org/2009/11/tls-renegotiation-test/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>13</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>TLS 1.2 in Windiows 7</title>
		<link>http://netsekure.org/2009/10/tls-1-2-in-windiows-7/</link>
		<comments>http://netsekure.org/2009/10/tls-1-2-in-windiows-7/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2009 05:52:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Nasko</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IE]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS1.1]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TLS1.2]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Win7]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Windows 7]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netsekure.org/?p=115</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Windows 7 includes support for TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2. I&#8217;ve been running with enabled 1.2 support for a while now and no problems at all, so I figured I&#8217;d share how to enable it. You need to import these 4 reg keys: Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocols\TLS 1.1\Client] "DisabledByDefault"=dword:00000000 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocols\TLS 1.1\Server] "DisabledByDefault"=dword:00000000 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocols\TLS [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://netsekure.org/2009/10/tls-1-2-in-windiows-7/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>6</slash:comments>
		</item>
	</channel>
</rss>

